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Abstract 
 
An Assessment of Operations and Maintenance Costs in Public-Private 
Partnerships 
 
Sergio Eduardo Martinez, M.S.E. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  C. Michael Walton 
Co-Supervisor: Michael R. Murphy 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) for the delivery of transportation infrastructure 
are said to offer increased efficiency resulting from the private sector’s life-cycle 
approach to design and construction. While the literature on PPPs endorses such 
efficiencies, studies don’t provide empirical support for that claim. The goal of this thesis 
was to assess that notion. 
Four tasks were carried out to explore that issue. First, a literature review 
searched for evidence of such efficiencies and methodologies to evaluate them. Second, a 
simple methodology to evaluate the life-cycle cost-efficiencies of the public and private 
sectors was proposed. Third, since most PPP projects in the U.S. are recent and currently 
subject to routine operations and maintenance (O&M), indicators to compare those costs 
were proposed as well. Fourth, a case study compared the routine O&M costs of a PPP 
and of those of a system of publicly developed and managed tollroads. 
 vii
The literature review found no empirical evidence of superior O&M cost-
efficiency of PPPs, and also, that most studies focused on design and construction cost 
and schedule overruns. While some studies assessing performance and/or efficiency were 
at times theoretical and not likely employed in practice, one methodology is proposed to 
evaluate life-cycle cost-efficiency. The case study results showed that the concessionaire 
was more cost-efficient in terms of operating expenditures (OPEX) per mile (-60%) and 
per lane-mile (-53%) than the system. The public system was more cost-efficient in 
OPEX per vehicle-miles travelled (97%), number of toll transactions (332%), and toll 
revenue (20%). However, those three indicators depend on traffic volume which during 
the study period was overwhelmingly greater on the public system. 
While the case study showed cost-efficiency differences between the public and 
private sectors, additional research is needed to empirically test the hypothesis of greater 
efficiency of the private sector. The proposed framework can be used, but adequate data 
and further assumptions about O&M costs are needed; for that, it is recommended that 
more comprehensive case studies be performed to obtain detailed empirical data. A better 
understanding of the differences in cost-efficiency between publicly and privately 
managed roads will help decision-makers minimize the life-cycle cost of their 
investments. 
 viii
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 BACKGROUND  
Demand for transportation infrastructure has been increasing in the last decades in 
the U.S. and it is forecast to continue growing. This happens at a time when a 
combination of factors undermines the financial capacity of transportation agencies and 
governments to provide for those needs (1): investment in transportation infrastructure is 
inadequate (2) as transportation agencies face increasing revenue shortfalls to maintain 
and expand their transportation systems (3). Consequently, funding and the delivery of 
transportation infrastructure in the U.S. are changing (4). 
In the search for alternatives to the decreasing purchasing power of traditional 
gas-tax-based funding mechanisms (3), and with increasing pressure to do more with less 
(2), officials at both state and local levels are increasingly considering innovative 
delivery options (3), including a more prominent role of the private sector. But private 
involvement in infrastructure delivery is not new (5): the responsibility for planning, 
building, and maintaining roadways has swung back and forth between the private sector 
and government agencies (6). In fact there is a continuum of delivery mechanisms that 
range from full public delivery to full privatization (7).  
One approach that has gained popularity is the incorporation of private sector 
investment for infrastructure provision, under the umbrella of what are known as public-
private partnerships (PPPs). Although PPPs have been used for centuries as a tool for 
governments to deliver public infrastructure (8), they have been receiving a great deal of 
attention lately in the U.S. as a method to stretch scarce funds (3, 9), and accelerate the 
provision of back-logged projects by leveraging the expertise and capital of the private 
sector (4).  
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1.1.1 What are PPPs?  
Public-private partnerships or PPPs can be loosely defined as cooperative 
institutional arrangements between the public and private sectors (10). Because of their 
broad definition there are several contractual arrangements that can be classified as PPPs 
(11). These definitions vary by country (12), causing disagreements about what a PPP 
actually is (10). 
For example, in the U.S. various procurement methods that involve the private 
sector have been used to deliver transportation infrastructure such as design-build (DB), 
design-build-finance (DBF), design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM), and other hybrid 
arrangements. Under the broad definition mentioned above, all of those procurement 
methods could be characterized as PPPs even though they differ in terms of how they 
split financing and operational functions and risks between the public and private partners 
(3). 
A contractual arrangement that bundles the design, construction, finance, 
operations and maintenance aspects of a legally and economically self-contained project 
into a long-term contract between a public entity and a standalone private firm—known 
as a special purpose vehicle (SPV)—is commonly referred to as a DBFOM (13); if the 
users pay directly for the service, these arrangements are also referred to as concessions 
(5). These types of PPP arrangements have been used extensively around the world to 
build roads, bridges, and tunnels (13) and are said to offer the largest potential gains in 
terms of risk sharing and efficiency because the private entity is in charge of all the 
phases of the project (3). For this reason, a DBFOM is the PPP model that concerns this 
thesis; any subsequent reference to PPPs refers to this specific model. 
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1.1.2 PPPs for the Delivery of Transportation Infrastructure  
Unlike other developed countries, such as Canada, the UK, and Australia, the U.S. 
has been slow to embrace PPPs; however, the momentum seems to be building for their 
increased application (8) as the number of PPPs used to deliver transportation 
infrastructure in the U.S. has increased in the last decade (14). Currently, there are 30 
proposals in the pipeline for DBFOM PPPs, with the majority proposed in the last 3 
years, including projects in 10 states that are trying PPPs for the first time: Alaska, 
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania (3).  
One challenge that arises with the trend of increasing PPP usage is that, while 
some agencies do not consider PPPs as an option, others prematurely identify a project as 
a PPP with no evaluation of how such a project would fare under other procurement 
methods (15). This lack of evaluation is problematic, since major decisions about 
transportation infrastructure investments should be the result of appropriate evaluations 
of the life-cycle benefits and trade-offs of various delivery methods.  
 
1.1.3 Evaluation of PPPs  
One of the most recognized methodologies used to perform these comparisons is a 
Value for Money (VfM) analysis. A VfM analysis, which has been described as “the 
optimal combination” of full life-cycle cost and the quality of the project being provided 
(16), is a tool used to compare the cost of a PPP project against the hypothetical 
traditional delivery cost (17), also known as a Public Sector Comparator. 
VfM is an established framework in the UK, Australia, Canada and the 
Netherlands, but its use is still uncommon and not standardized in the U.S. (18).  In fact, 
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there are debates about its adequacy (19) and calls for further research on evaluation tools 
for PPP proposals and projects (15).  
 
1.1.4 The Efficiency Claim of PPPs  
PPPs for the delivery of transportation infrastructure are said to offer faster 
project delivery, freeing up of public funds, and among other benefits, increased 
efficiency through the private sector’s life-cycle approach to design and construction (1, 
4, 12, 20). In a recent survey, transportation PPP stakeholders in the U.S. were asked 
about the benefits that the private sector could bring to transportation infrastructure 
provision and the most frequent answer was the possibility to expedite the delivery of the 
projects, followed by life-cycle cost planning, which was said to result in long-term 
efficiencies (14).  
Respondents felt such efficiencies would arise from a single entity administering 
the integrated planning of a project’s entire life-cycle—in this case, a private 
concessionaire (14, 19). By “efficiencies,” they meant reduced costs in the operation of 
the facility as the result of design, construction, and operation practices focused on life-
cycle asset management under a performance-based contract (6, 19, 21).  
The rationale is that the bundling of the facility’s construction and operation into 
a single contract allows the internalization of any positive externalities that may exist 
between the construction and operational phases, thereby lowering the life-cycle 
maintenance cost of the facility (5). Further, it is in the concessionaire’s best interest to 
minimize operations and maintenance (O&M) costs and problems (15, 22) because 1) a 
PPP concessionaire is paid a fixed amount of money to build and maintain the facility at 
contractually specified service levels for long periods of time, and 2) the O&M phase is 
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the longest on a PPP concession and the most important, as is when the service delivery 
and payment conditions are created (20).  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 Although cost is not the only factor that must be considered when exploring 
alternative delivery methods such as PPPs, it is the one most often cited by advocates, 
both for and against, to support their positions (2). According to Papajohn et al., the 
primary reasons for which states enter into PPP projects is for financial reasons (57%), 
followed by the prospect of time and cost savings (21%) (15). 
Yet, despite the widespread notion in the literature and among PPP stakeholders 
that the private sector is more efficient in managing road infrastructure than the public 
sector, limited empirical evidence support can be found in the literature to demonstrate 
such efficiencies (18). Because current debates over PPPs are characterized by loud 
criticism or gushing praise rather than evidence-based learning and synthesis (10), there 
is a need for evidence-based findings to provide clarity on what PPPs can and cannot 
offer (14), especially in terms of efficiency and cost savings. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH GOAL AND OBJECTIVES  
 The goal of this thesis is to assess the notion of whether the private sector is more 
cost-efficient than the public sector in the management of transportation infrastructure in 
the U.S. At present, both the number and tenure of PPP road facilities in the U.S. are 
limited, but are forecast to increase. As the number of PPPs in operation increases and the 
facilities in operation start aging—with the consequent need for larger and more frequent 
maintenance interventions—additional data will be available to perform more 
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comprehensive comparisons on the efficiency differences, if any, between the public and 
private sectors. Such comparisons should become key elements of future feasibility 
evaluations of PPP proposals.  
To aid in the development of such evaluations, three objectives were defined. The 
first objective was to conduct a literature review searching for empirical evidence of such 
efficiencies and a methodology to evaluate the life-cycle cost efficiency differences 
between the public and private sectors. Since most PPP projects in the U.S. have only 
recently started operations and are currently subject to routine O&M activities, a second 
objective was to propose a set of simple indicators to compare the routine O&M costs of 
roadway facilities. To illustrate their use, a third objective was to conduct a case study 
comparing the cost of routine O&M activities of a group of toll highways in the U.S. (a 
PPP concession, and a system of roads developed and managed by a public agency), to 
determine if the PPP concessionaire manages its road infrastructure more efficiently than 
the public sector does.  
A better understanding of any cost-efficiency differences between publicly and 
privately managed tollroads will provide decision-makers a clearer indication of how the 
selection of a delivery method could affect the overall life-cycle cost of their investments.  
 
1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION  
 This chapter introduced the concept of using PPPs for the delivery of 
transportation infrastructure and the notion that PPPs impart efficiencies in the 
management of that infrastructure. Chapter 2 presents a literature review in which the 
research team sought empirical evidence of such efficiencies and/or methods to evaluate 
them. Chapter 3 discusses a methodology that could be used to compare the efficiency of 
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PPPs vis-à-vis traditional procurement projects. Chapter 4 presents a case study 
comparing the routine O&M costs of a group of toll roads managed by both the private 
and the public sectors in a U.S. state. Conclusions are discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, 
limitations of this thesis and recommendations for future work are presented in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 2: PPPs vs Traditional Delivery for Highway Projects  
As summarized by DeCorla-Souza et al. (19), when a public agency seeks to 
evaluate highway investment and procurement decisions, that agency can be trying to 
answer any of four questions. The first two are concerned with how the proposed project 
could benefit society in general:  
1. Will investing in this project yield societal benefits that exceed the costs to 
society over the long run?  
2. Will one method of procurement deliver greater net societal benefits than another 
method? 
These questions address economic efficiency. As such, an appropriate method to 
address them is a Benefit-Cost Analysis—a comprehensive framework that allows the 
assessment of a full range of costs, risks, and benefits that can incorporate difficult-to-
quantify factors such as externalities. 
The last two questions focus on the financial aspects of the procurement decision 
from the point of view of the public agency’s financial balance sheet: 
3. What is the best procurement approach? 
4. Is the bid price that the private entity in a PPP is offering (or willing to accept) a 
good value for the public agency? 
The answers to these two questions depend on the transaction’s financial details. 
To answer the third question, quantitative VfM analysis is an appropriate tool and as such 
it has been used in other studies (19). On the other hand, to evaluate the bid price in the 
fourth question, valuation studies based on the discounted net present value of the 
project’s cash flows are generally used (19). 
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Because this thesis is concerned with the notion of whether private sector 
practices are more cost-efficient for the delivery and operation of transportation 
infrastructure, the last two questions are relevant. The third one is of particular interest, as 
a better understanding of whether the private sector is indeed more efficient could aid 
decision-makers in their selection of procurement methods.  
To understand if and how such notion had been evaluated, a literature review was 
conducted to identify evaluations of PPPs. The focus was on comparisons between PPPs 
and traditional procurements, the performance and efficiency evaluations of PPPs, and  
the O&M phase of PPPs. Studies considered relevant are discussed next. 
 
2.1 COST AND DURATION  
Studies about PPP performance have tended to focus on their cost and schedule. 
This is understandable since, as mentioned in Chapter 1, cost is the most frequently cited 
element by both PPP supporters and critics to support their positions (2). Another fact is 
that, in traditional procurement the public sector carries the majority of construction cost 
and delay risks and therefore cost and time overruns are common (5).  
Such studies are mostly about the design and construction phases since the 
majority of projects are still in operation, many in their early years, but also because of 
the difficulties in obtaining performance data about the O&M phases. Two broad types of 
comparisons were found in the literature: one comparing the total cost of construction, 
and the other comparing the cost and schedule changes to the project’s contract. 
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2.1.1 Total Cost  
In the frequently cited study “Ex Ante Construction Costs in the European Road 
Sector: A Comparison of Public-Private Partnerships and Traditional Public 
Procurement,” Blanc-Brude et al. compared the cost of constructing road projects in 
Europe under PPPs and under traditional procurement to examine whether and by how 
much construction costs differed. They defined PPPs as DBFOM contracts and traditional 
procurement as every other model; such classification was based on the premise that non-
DBFOM projects involve public rather than private finance, and that it is the private 
financing element that creates the incentives and risk allocation that define PPPs (5). 
Their study was based on a review of economic theory that suggested that the ex-
ante construction cost of a PPP should be higher than in traditional procurement. The 
authors summarized the reasons for that as deriving from three main factors: 
1. The control of the asset by the concessionaire: Under a PPP, the private sector 
controls the asset so any gains from making cost-saving investments will be 
accrued by the concessionaire; this creates an incentive to undertake such 
investments. 
2. The bundling of asset construction and operations: Bundling construction and 
operations into one contract allows positive externalities between those two 
phases to be internalized by the concessionaire. This incentivizes the 
concessionaire to seek life-cycle cost savings by making changes during design 
and undertaking investments during construction to reduce the asset’s O&M 
costs. 
3. The transfer of construction risk to the concessionaire: On a PPP project, the 
private partner carries all the construction risks and is compensated for accepting 
them, whereas on traditional procurement the public sector bears those risks. 
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Consequently, a higher ex-ante construction cost should be expected on a PPP due 
to the explicit recognition and pricing of the transferred risks. 
 
While recognizing that the costs and benefits of PPPs should be evaluated over a 
project’s entire life cycle up to the end of the contract, Blanc-Brude et al. acknowledged 
that it was only in the last two decades that PPP procurement started to take off in 
Europe, and so most projects were still in operation at the time of their study in 2006. As 
a result, most available information about those projects corresponded to the construction 
phase; for that reason, their study focused on construction costs only. 
The projects to be compared were selected from the database of road projects 
financed by the European Investment Bank between 1990 and 2005. With data from over 
200 projects, a reduced-form empirical model was developed with the natural logarithm 
of ex-ante unit construction costs, in millions of Euros per kilometer, as the dependent 
variable. Those unit construction costs included construction work, design, engineering, 
and supervision, since those items are directly related to the specifications of the project, 
the authors said. On the other hand, the explanatory variables used could be classified as 
either economic determinants of construction costs (procurement method and labor 
costs); technical determinants of road construction costs (type of roadway, number of 
lanes, terrain, etc.); or country dummies (to capture country-specific attributes such as 
political features, institutional arrangements, etc.). 
The results of their empirical analysis showed that, on average, the PPP projects 
had 24% higher ex-ante construction costs than the projects delivered by traditional 
procurement. The authors suggested that such difference could be the result of higher 
investments made in the design/construction phases to reduce costs during the projects’ 
operations, and of the risk premium charged by the private sector for assuming the 
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transferred risks. Yet, they argued that it could also be the result of other factors, such as 
the higher bidding cots of PPPs compared to traditional projects, the lower competition in 
the PPP markets, or even of corruption in the awarding of PPPs.  
Moreover, it was noted that the estimated 24% difference in ex-ante costs was 
similar to the typical cost overruns observed in European road projects procured 
traditionally. According to the authors, such similarity suggested that the bulk of the 
difference in costs reflected the price that the public sector paid to avoid cost and 
schedule overruns as well as changes in the projects’ specifications, making other sources 
of higher PPP costs seem less important.  
Lastly, Blanc-Brude et al. acknowledged that because their analysis focused only 
on the construction costs, and did not quantify the impact of such costs on the projects 
life-cycle costs or benefits, the results did not allow them to draw normative conclusions 
about the economic desirability of PPPs as a procurement method. Those types of 
analyses would require a large number of completed PPP projects (5).  
 
2.1.2 Cost and Schedule Changes  
To evaluate whether transportation infrastructure projects performed as promised 
in terms of costs, Flyvbjerg et al. (23) analyzed the largest sample of projects at the time 
(2003), which included 258 projects in 20 countries, valued at approximately US$90 
billion (in constant 1995 dollars prices). The results showed with overwhelming 
statistical significance that in terms of costs, transportation infrastructure projects (of all 
types) did not perform as promised and, instead, costs were highly uncertain. 
Specifically, the study found that nine out of ten transportation infrastructure projects 
suffered cost escalation, with road projects experiencing an average cost escalation of 
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20%. Cost escalation was found to be a global issue, as it was documented across 20 
nations on five continents. 
From their results, they concluded that the cost estimates used in public debates 
and decision-making for transport infrastructure development were highly, 
systematically, and significantly misleading. Furthermore, they argued that such 
misleading of costs generated risks that were typically ignored or underplayed in 
decision-making.  
The risk of cost overruns is, along with the risk of schedule delays, one of the 
main risks typically transferred to the private partner in a PPP. For that reason, our 
review moved on to explore evaluations of PPPs.  
 
2.1.3 PPP Evaluations in Europe and Australia  
Studies to evaluate the cost and schedule performance of PPPs have focused on 
more mature PPP markets, namely Europe and Australia. Numerous references to their 
results can be found in the PPP literature. For example, Chasey et al. cites various studies 
showing that cost and schedule overruns are common in the construction of highways 
over US$100 million, as found in various countries including the UK, Canada, and the 
U.S. (6).  
Akbiyikli (22), Raisbeck et al. (24), Hodge and Greve (10), and others referenced 
the findings from the UK’s National Audit Office, which in 2003 evaluated 98 projects to 
find that 76% of private finance initiative (PFI) (the UK term for PPPs) projects resulted 
in on-time delivery, compared to 30% for the non-PFI projects, and that 79% of the PFIs 
delivered the asset on budget, versus only 27% of the traditional projects (25). Findings 
from a 2003 study by the HM Treasury, the UK’s economic and finance ministry, are 
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also mentioned frequently. Such report found that 88% of PFI projects were delivered on 
time and 79% on budget (26).  
Results from many studies can be found throughout the PPP literature suggesting 
PPPs as a superior model in terms of cost and schedule control as compared to traditional 
procurement. However, Hodge and Greve pointed out several different reasons that 
statistically solid evidence to support such a notion is weak and at times controversial 
(10). Raisbeck et al. also echoed critiques made by researchers at University College 
London (27) about the then-existing research on PPP performance, which was suggested 
to be biased in favor of PPPs.  
Addressing most of those identified issues, Raisbeck et al. designed a rigorous 
methodological approach to compare time and cost in Australian PPPs with projects 
delivered via traditional procurement methods, motivated by concerns of widespread 
optimism bias and the lack of appropriate data for capital projects decision-making (24).  
Separating projects into two pools, 21 PPPs (7 transportation-related) and 33 
traditional projects (16 transportation-related) were compared based on publicly available 
data. Selected projects were those undertaken after the then-latest PPP policy changes in 
2000, largely completed, with capital budgets over $20 million. Additionally, the two 
pools of projects were created with a similar number of projects and with projects of 
similar complexity.  
The results showed superior cost efficiency of PPPs over the traditional projects, 
as the PPPs presented an average of 2.4% cost overruns between contractual commitment 
and final outcome, versus 13.8% of traditional projects. Time overruns were 2.5% for 
PPPs and 2.3% for traditional projects, which the authors characterized as exceptional for 
PPPs given that they are subjected to additional scrutiny, and that traditional projects 
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were said to have a head start since their general specifications are usually known at the 
project’s announcement.  
From those results, it was concluded that PPPs in Australia provided superior 
performance in terms of both the cost and time. It was also noted that the advantages of 
PPP increased with the size and the complexity of the projects. 
 
2.1.4 PPP Evaluations in North America  
As illustrative as the results from international studies can be to decision-makers 
in the U.S., those markets are so different that the findings cannot be directly transferable 
to the North American PPP market (6). For that reason, and with the goal of objectively 
evaluating the performance of very large PPP projects, Chasey et al. performed what they 
claimed to be the first comprehensive study comparing PPP transportation projects in 
North America against traditionally delivered projects in a paper called “A Comparison 
of PPPs and Traditional Procurement Methods in North American Highway 
Construction.” For their study, traditional projects were defined as those delivered 
through any procurement method other than DBFOM.  
They conducted a literature review of cost and schedule growth in Design-Bid-
Build (DBB) and Design-Build (DB) highway projects and used the results as a 
benchmark for comparison against a group of PPP highway projects. The two metrics 
used for the comparison were the average cost change and average schedule change, 
calculated as the difference between the estimates at the financial close of the PPPs and 
the actual cost and schedules. 
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The 12 PPP projects selected for this study were highway and bridge projects 
constructed between 1990 and 2010, delivered as DBFOMs, with costs between $90 
million and $1.1 billion. They were all located either in the U.S. or in Canada. 
From the literature review, Chasey et al. selected two studies said to provide the 
best comparisons to their study: the studies by Tom Warne and Associates (28), and by 
Shrestha (29). They were selected because they focused on North American projects 
constructed in the same time period, and within similar cost ranges of the PPP projects. 
Warne’s study, however, did not compare directly the DBB and DB projects but instead 
asked the project managers of 21 DB projects in the U.S. to estimate the time the projects 
would have taken if delivered as DBBs. Shrestha’s did compare projects: four DB 
projects across the U.S. against four DBB projects from Texas. The results of the 
comparisons are seen in table 1. 
Table 1. Results of the Comparison by Chasey et al. 
Authors Projects Compared Delivery Method Location
Cost 
Change 
(%) 
Schedule 
Change 
(%) 
Chasey 
et al. 
12 DBFOM projects between 
US$90 and US$110 million DBFOM
U.S. and 
Canada 0.81 -0.3 
Warne 21 DB projects with costs greater than US$83 million DB U.S. 4 -11 
Shrestha 4 DBB and 4 DB projects with costs over US$100 million 
DBB U.S.  12.71 4.34 
DB Texas  1.49 11.04 
 
The comparison showed that the DBFOM projects performed better in terms of 
cost change (0.81%) than did the DBs (4% and 1.49%), and much better than the DBBs 
(12.71%). From this, Chasey et al. concluded that the cost control of DFOM projects may 
be attributable to the DB portion more than the FOM portion, a somewhat adventurous 
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statement if only based on the presented evidence, although they did recommend more 
research on the topic.  
In terms of schedule, they found that of the 12 PPP projects, only one was late 
while seven were completed early, for an average schedule change of -0.3%. This was 
compared to the schedule change of the DBs (-11% in Warne’s study and 11.04% in 
Shrestha’s) and of the DBBs (4.34%), showing the PPP projects as the better performers 
and presenting conflicting results about the DB projects. Chasey et al. highlighted that the 
DB projects in Warne’s study performed better than all other projects, including PPPs, 
and that Shrestha’s DB projects performed worse than all other projects, including the 
DBBs. However, Chasey et al. did not venture to provide an explanation for this result. 
One possible explanation could be that Shrestha’s projects were all from the same state 
(Texas), which might have had some unique circumstances that affected their 
performance at the time, while Warner’s projects were located across the U.S. 
In their summarizing comments, Chasey et al. mentioned that of the 12 PPP 
projects, 10 did not result in any cost or schedule increase, for an 80% success ratio. 
Based on their findings, Chasey et al posed doubts about what they referred to as the 
conventional wisdom that the construction phase is the riskiest of highway project 
phases. In reference to the schedule change, they acknowledged the good performance of 
the PPP projects, which they justified as resulting from the concessionaire’s incentive to 
have the project in operation as soon as possible to start recovering their investment. 
From that assertion, they claimed that it is expected that PPP projects would be finished 
on-time. 
Finally, the authors rightly recognized that, as positive these specific outcomes 
may be, cost and schedule control are only two of the many aspects of a PPP delivery 
model. Therefore, they recommended research on other aspects that could result in 
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additional saving and efficiencies, and specifically, on the O&M portion, which they 
related to the private sector’s incentive to produce a better quality project. Because the 12 
PPP projects in their study were still in operation at the time of the comparison and thus 
had not completed their contractual cycle, they suggested a comparison of the life-cycle 
asset management costs between a PPP and a traditionally delivered project.  
In summary, the literature review showed that, as acknowledged by Blanc-Brude 
et al., “the comparison of cost [and schedule] overruns in PPPs and traditional public 
procurement is arguably a comparison of apples and oranges” because there is less 
incentive to provide accurate construction budgets in traditional procurement as it is the 
public sector who bears those risks (5). Also, since most PPP projects are still in 
construction or in their early years of operation, most studies focused solely on the 
performance during the design and construction phases. Yet, for a PPP to offer a greater 
VfM to the public agency and the project users, there must be other sources of value 
during the project’s life cycle. For that reason, the literature review was extended to 
explore other types of PPP evaluations. 
 
2.2 EFFICIENCY OF PPPS  
Expanding the focus beyond the design and construction phases, the literature 
review in relation to the so-called efficiencies of the private sector did not yield nearly as 
many results. Two relevant studies are discussed next. 
A paper entitled “General Framework for Evaluating Long-Term Leasing of Toll 
Roads. Case Study of Indiana I-90 Highway” focused on the long-term leasing of toll 
roads such as the Chicago Skyway in 2005 and the Indiana Toll Road in 2006. According 
to the authors, such deals resulted in negative public perceptions about taxpayer-funded 
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facilities being offered to private entities with little public control (1). Thus, the authors 
proposed a general probabilistic framework to evaluate long-term leases of toll roads, 
consisting of an analysis of 1) the PPP’s economic efficiency in comparison to in-house 
toll road management, and 2) the protection of the public interest.  
For this thesis, only the economic efficiency evaluation is relevant. In that regard, 
Zhang et al. used net present values (NPV) to compare the economic efficiency of two 
scenarios. In the first scenario, the public agency leases the toll road to a private 
concessionaire; in the second one, the agency continues to operate the toll road over the 
lease period. In the latter, the agency would need to predict its in-house management 
revenues and costs over the same period of time as the proposed lease to compare them 
with the price offered by the private sector for leasing the toll road. 
For the privatization scenario, it was assumed that the public agency would 
receive an up-front payment for the lease with no revenue or risk sharing; thus, because 
the analysis was done from the point of view of the agency, this up-front payment was 
the only factor to be considered for the NPV analysis, as the agency would relinquish 
control of the facility.  
For the in-house management scenario, the NPV of all revenues, including 
uncertainties in the evaluation factors, were calculated as follows: 
 
ܴሺߝோሻ ൌ 	෍ሾݒ௜ሺߝ௩ሻ ∗ ݐ௜ሺߝ௧ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሺߝ௥ሻሻ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ݋ݎ௜ሺߝ௢௥ሻሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሺߝ௥ሻሻ௜ሿ 
 
where: 
R = present worth of total revenues in lease period, 
vi = traffic volume in year i, 
ti = average toll for unit traffic in year i, 
ori (εor) = other revenues excluding toll revenue in year i, 
n = total years of lease period, 
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ri = discount rate in year i, and 
εR, εv, εt, εor, and εr = uncertainties related to toll revenue, traffic volume growth, toll rate 
growth, other revenues, and discount rate. 
 
The NPV of the costs were estimated as: 
 
ܥሺߝ஼ሻ ൌ 	෍݋௜
ሺߝ௢ሻ ∗ ݌௜൫ߝ௣൯ ൅ ݋ܿ௜ሺߝ௢௖ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሺߝ௥ሻሻ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
where: 
C = present worth of total costs in entire lease period, 
oi = operating costs in year i, 
pi = preservation costs in year i, 
oci = other costs in year i, and 
εo, εp, and εoc = uncertainties related to operating costs, preservation costs, and other 
costs. 
 
By comparing the NPVs of the two scenarios, Zhang et al. suggested that the 
public agency could evaluate the relative economic efficiency of the two alternatives. 
Then they wondered about possible reasons for the two NPVs to be different. In other 
words, what could be the rationale for privatization? 
Responding to their own question, they suggested two possible answers: one 
focusing on revenues and one focusing on costs. For the former, they argued that a public 
agency would not increase toll rates as frequently or as high, therefore collecting less 
revenue; for the latter, they claimed that the private sector tends to exhibit relatively 
superior operating efficiencies and use more advanced maintenance technologies, 
implying reduced costs. Such claimed efficiencies by the private sector are what concern 
this thesis. 
A case study of the Indiana I-90 toll road lease was done to illustrate the proposed 
framework and an NPV analysis (based on a Monte Carlo simulation) was done to 
account for the uncertainties in the framework’s inputs. The results indicated that from a 
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purely financial perspective, the public agency made the right decision by privatizing the 
toll road.  
A different type of analysis was undertaken by researchers at George Mason 
University with the same goal of evaluating the efficiency of PPPs. In a paper titled 
“Efficiency of Public-Private Partnerships: A Frontier Analysis of Highway P3s,” Daito 
and Gifford argued that previous studies have evaluated the performance and efficiency 
of PPPs through statistical analyses but that approach is problematic for two reasons: 1) 
in the U.S. the number of completed PPP projects has not been large enough to allow 
rigorous statistical analysis, and 2) those analyses require a priori functional forms to be 
specified, making them difficult (18).  
To circumvent those issues, and as an initial step toward the comparative 
evaluation of cost efficiency between PPP and traditionally procured projects, the authors 
evaluated the efficiency of PPP delivery—measured as cost savings—using frontier 
analysis, a framework that has been employed to investigate the production of goods and 
services in various contexts. Specifically, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was used. 
DEA is a non-parametric approach to conduct efficiency analysis of multiple inputs 
and/or outputs of a production process; it imposes minimum assumptions and does not 
require the specification of an a priori functional form for empirical estimation.  
The authors claimed to be the first to use non-parametric frontier analysis in the 
context of PPPs, and that they did it to explore whether such a framework could be used 
to address the efficiency question. Their study used roadway projects as the Decision 
Making Units (DMUs), and project delivery as the production of those DMUs. DMUs 
were defined for this study as tolled or non-tolled road capacity expansion projects 
delivered as DB, DBF, Design-Build-Maintain (DBM), or DBFOM contracts. Such 
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procurement models were selected, authors said, because they involve considerable risk 
transfer compared with the traditional DBB model.  
The model used project costs as the input and the delivered roadway projects as 
the output to evaluate 37 projects in the U.S., several of which are located in states 
considered PPP leaders: California, Florida, Texas, and Virginia. The model’s input 
variable was the projects’ total cost at the financial close (in 2012 dollars), while “lane-
mileage,” “the number of bridges,” and “the number of interchanges” were the output 
variables. However, acknowledging severe limitations on the availability of data, the 
authors recognized that these types of projects are quite complex and as such their output 
should include more variables. 
Their analysis calculated global and local efficiency scores and scale efficiency, 
as well as increasing/decreasing returns to scale for each DMU. Yet, unusual results 
arose, including extremely low efficiency scores for many DMUs and large gaps between 
the actual and the target inputs. The authors hypothesized that this was due to the need 
for more sophisticated variable specifications to better capture project outputs and 
activities, and for better data quality.  
For future research, they suggested the incorporation of environmental and socio-
economic factors, such as the urban or rural character of the project, the area’s per capita 
income, and many others, due to the likelihood of such factors affecting DMU efficiency 
levels and cost structures. Including them would, according to the authors, deepen the 
understanding of the relationships between institutional and market conditions and 
project performance and would allow the use of the proposed framework to aid decision-
makers in their selection of procurement mechanisms for the delivery of infrastructure. 
In their concluding remarks, Daito and Gifford recognized the challenges to 
empirically evaluate whether the cost savings presumption under which PPPs were 
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originally proposed holds true in actual projects. In that regard, they assessed the 
contribution of their study as an early empirical analysis on the relative costs of U.S. 
PPPs and one of the first studies to use DEA to analyze the efficiency of infrastructure 
projects.  
 
2.3 PERFORMANCE OF PPPS  
The long-term nature of a PPP gives rise to project components and risks not 
typically found in a traditional project, some of which can change dynamically over the 
life of the project. Consequently, evaluating a PPP project is more difficult than 
evaluating a traditional project, and therefore the use of time and cost measurements do 
not reflect the complexity associated with PPPs. This is the premise behind an Australian 
study titled “Conceptual Framework for the Performance Measurement of Public-
Private Partnerships” (12). 
In that paper, a literature review performed by Liu et al. showed that performance 
measurement in the construction industry has focused on product-oriented measures; this 
means that the performance indicators used to evaluate construction projects are 
established after the project has been completed. In the same way, the development 
process of a PPP project has been subjected to evaluation only in its final phase, making 
it only a review, and therefore an ineffective way to try to control and improve the 
delivery of the asset. This is important because the lack of a life-cycle perspective in the 
performance measurement, juxtaposed with dynamic measures can contribute to 
inefficient and ineffective decision-making (30).  
The life cycle of a PPP project can be grouped into three major phases: Initiation 
and Planning; Procurement; and Partnership (construction, operation, and maintenance) 
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(31). Thus, Haponava and Al-Jibouri suggested that a dynamic life-cycle perspective 
should be used to measure the performance of a PPP project with a phase-based 
evaluation to replace the traditional product-oriented approach (30). 
Liu et al. considered that performance evaluation of PPPs has received limited 
attention, in particular in terms of their dynamic life cycle. For this reason, they proposed 
a conceptual dynamic life-cycle performance measurement framework for PPP 
infrastructure projects that can deal with the complexities arising from having multiple 
stakeholders (12). They decided to use the performance prism based on the arguments of 
Neely et al. (32), which considered the prism a holistic framework capable of dealing 
with multiple stakeholders and guiding the design of performance measurement for long 
term success in a business environment. The performance prism consists of five 
interrelated facets: stakeholder satisfaction; strategies; processes; capabilities; and 
stakeholder contribution.  
Typical evaluations of PPP projects occur either at the initiation stage (ex-ante) or 
at the end of the project (ex-post). But, according to Haponava and Al-Jibouri, they fail to 
effectively and efficiently control the entire development process of the project (30). To 
make it a comprehensive life-cycle evaluation, Liu et al. suggested placing two 
evaluation nodes between the “pre-tendering” and the “bidding” phases, and between the 
“contract and financial close” and the “contract management” phases, as shown in Figure 
1. With four evaluation nodes, project managers could then measure project performance 
in each life-cycle phase using a set of core indicators (CIs) that they derived from the 
literature on PPP performance measurement. 
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Figure 1. Proposed Evaluation Nodes within the Life Cycle of a PPP. Adapted from the 
“Dynamic life-cycle performance measurement framework of PPP projects” 
proposed by Liu et al. 
The proposed life-cycle evaluation is dependent upon continuous improvement. 
As such, learning mechanisms have been embedded into the framework to assist 
organizations in systematically acquiring their lessons learned. The authors argued that, 
using their proposed framework, PPP project managers can grasp the project’s 
performance information by analyzing the developed CIs at each evaluation node, which 
would provide them real-time performance review capabilities. This method would help 
project managers to identify how well their resources were utilized in the previous phase, 
what should be done to improve, and what should be the focus in the subsequent phase. 
Lastly, the paper recognizes that their proposed framework has not been validated, but 
that ongoing research is in progress to test it through case studies and surveys.  
Overall, Liu et al.’s proposed evaluation framework is said to help capture some 
of the dynamism of a PPP project by using the performance prism with the set of phase-
based indicators proposed. As such, it should help improve project performance 
evaluations even while the project is under way, giving it a sort of “real-time” capability. 
Yet, while the proposed framework can be of great help to PPP project managers by 
providing detailed insights into the project’s effectiveness and efficiency, its use would 
not be appropriate for comparing them to traditionally developed projects because the 
latter are by nature fragmented into pieces for which different parties are responsible, 
with each party interested in and responsible only for their piece. 
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2.4 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE IN PPPS  
One method to evaluate the performance of a PPP during the O&M phase could 
be to benchmark actual performance data against an appropriate standard. Such standards 
can vary and may include the original contract, the public sector comparator, 
performance data from similar facilities that were procured traditionally, and 
performance data from private competitors of the private partner (33).  
Two of those methods have been documented in this thesis to evaluate the design 
and construction phases: benchmarking against conventional procurement and 
benchmarking against the original contract. However, their use for the evaluation of the 
O&M phase is problematic because most PPPs in the U.S. are recent; few projects have 
been in operation long enough to provide adequate performance data for comparison. 
There is also the issue of data confidentiality and the difficulty of having a private entity 
share their proprietary performance data. Additionally, in the case of benchmarking 
against the original contact, since the O&M phase in a PPP concession is usually very 
long, changes in the requirements would not be unexpected—which would complicate 
the comparisons between the original specifications and the tasks actually performed 
(33). 
Perhaps for these reasons, the literature review did not find adequate empirical 
evaluations of the O&M phase of PPPs in the road sector. A different approach to 
evaluate the performance of a concessionaire in the O&M phase is discussed next.  
In the UK, PFI projects are designed to fund long-term infrastructure and public 
services; they are the equivalent (and some argue the precursors) of what other countries 
call PPPs. In a 2002 paper titled “Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Management in 
PFI Road Projects in the UK” (20), Akbiyikli and Eaton cited a report from the UK’s 
Private Finance Panel (34) arguing that a PFI is designed not to borrow money from the 
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private sector but to transfer risk to the private sector. Coupled with efficiencies in 
management, a PFI’s resulting benefits would outweigh the higher costs of private 
funding, resulting in greater value to taxpayers. This is the same argument that resonates 
with PPP supporters in other countries.  
Under that premise, and the idea that the O&M is the most important phase in a 
PFI project (as it is the time at which the service is delivered and the payment conditions 
are created), Akbiyikli and Eaton examined the then-current O&M management practices 
in PFI road projects in the UK (20). Based on two DBFOM empirical case studies, they 
proposed a conceptual framework for the O&M management of PFIs that identified 
physical and functional performance as the critical O&M criteria. 
Because DBFOM contracts are output focused, they define a functional 
specification; thus, the PFI output specifications clarify the functional requirements and 
the physical performance criteria. Thus, the public sector specifies the requirements (the 
what) and leaves the private sector to determine the best way to meet those requirements 
(the how), which is supposed to incentivize the private sector to innovate in the design 
and the provision of the O&M services to meet the specified outputs.  
Their proposed O&M life-cycle management framework has two primary 
parameters: physical performance and functional performance, which the authors said 
should be defined concurrently and cannot be separated. The physical performance 
parameters relate to the asset; e.g., the maintenance, durability, and environmental 
impacts of road projects. The functional performance parameters relate to the appropriate 
functioning of the asset; e.g., driving comfort, safety, and ease of access.  
The secondary parameters of their framework were defined as innovation, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and certainty, all of which are to be measured relative to the 
output specifications defined by the public sector in terms of time, cost, and quality, the 
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authors said. Efficiency, which is the focus of this thesis, is defined as the minimization 
of resources required to deliver the agreed outputs at appropriate quality levels. It is thus 
concerned with the ratio of inputs to outputs and is said to reflect the management of the 
delivery and operation of the roadway throughout its life.  
From their analysis of the two case studies and interviews with staff from the 
projects private partners, Akbiyikli and Eaton concluded that the functional and 
performance requirements have to be considered at the beginning of the project, and that 
the management of the O&M has to focus on the delivery of the services by minimizing 
the O&M expenses while maximizing the quality of those services (20). They arrived at 
such conclusions based on the considerations of the staff in the sense that taking a life-
cycle approach to the management of the roads translated into higher construction quality 
than in traditional procurement, which in turn reduced the need for longer term 
maintenance throughout the life of the project. In that sense, the projects achieved 
efficiency. 
While their paper was strictly theoretical and the framework seemed unpractical 
at first, as there were no indications of how it was to be used, in a subsequent study 
Akbiyikli applied the framework to a PFI road project on the eastern coast of Scotland: 
the A92 project. As documented in the paper titled “Performance Assessment of a 
Private Finance Initiative Road Project,” the objective was to examine whether the 
performance in the operations phase of that project effectively complied with the output 
specifications to the satisfaction of the road users (22). 
Based on a survey and a semi-structured interview, Akbiyikli examined the first 
four years of the O&M phase of the A92 project to assess whether the road users were 
satisfied with the performance of the PFI project. In that regard, according to the author, 
the study used a “phenomenological qualitative approach” to “inductively and holistically 
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understand human experience in the specific setting of a PFI project” (22). In simpler 
terms, it sought to evaluate whether the users were satisfied with the project without 
searching for the causes of their satisfaction or their lack of it.  
The study analyzed the project’s Customer Satisfaction Surveys from the period 
between 2005 and 2009, using the results of the first year (2005–2006) to benchmark the 
customers' perception about the O&M contractor's performance. The results of the last 
two surveys were said to show very high percentages of users indicating that the 
performance of the O&M contractor was above average when compared with that of 
similar roads and many survey responses were said to include complimentary comments. 
According to the author, the Customer Satisfaction Survey results showed that the 
A92 project satisfied all the performance criteria: strategic objectives, efficiency, service 
delivery outcomes, quality, and effectiveness. For that reason, Akbiyikli concluded that 
after four years of operation the A92 concession year was performing very well and to 
the satisfaction of both the public and private partners as well as its customers.  
Akbiyikli’s paper illustrated a different type of evaluation method than the ones 
discussed before as it focused on qualitatively assessing the performance of the project 
from the point of view of the users. While it was based on a single project and therefore it 
does not allow generalizing about PPP as a procurement method, it was said to provide a 
very good indication of the subject project (22). Another issue is that the results were not 
compared against a traditionally procured project. However, such a comparison would 
only require conducting similar surveys to obtain comparable data. 
In summary, assessing the satisfaction of PPP customers is important and should 
be encouraged as part of a more comprehensive evaluation of the real benefits of PPPs 
beyond the mere financial aspects. Also, benchmarking actual O&M performance data 
from a PPP against a traditionally procured project, while difficult to do, could provide 
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definite insights into the so-called efficiencies created by the involvement of the private 
sector. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology to Compare the Life-Cycle Efficiency of PPPs 
and Traditionally Procured Projects  
The literature review demonstrated that overall comparisons of the benefits and 
costs of PPPs vis-à-vis traditional procurement are difficult and require comprehensive 
evaluation frameworks. Moreover, it was shown that empirically determining whether or 
not PPPs result in more efficient life-cycle management than traditional procurement is 
difficult: an individual project cannot be assessed until it has completed its contract cycle, 
and a program cannot be assessed until a sufficient number of projects are completed. 
 
3.1 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY  
From the evaluation methodologies reviewed in Chapter 2, the authors finds the 
one proposed by Zhang et al. as the most appropriate for comparing the life-cycle 
economic efficiency in the delivery, operation, and maintenance of toll roads for the 
public and private sectors. The reasons for this preference are the methodology’s life-
cycle approach, simplicity, and the capability of its probabilistic nature to incorporate the 
inherent uncertainties of the inputs. Besides, the framework can be used in a multiple-
scenario approach; for this assessment, scenario one would be a DBFOM concession, and 
scenario two a publicly developed and managed project.  
Zhang’s paper illustrated the use of the framework with a case study that 
evaluated the leasing of a toll road against the alternative of continued in-house 
management by a public entity. While that example was correctly analyzed, to be able to 
compare a DBFOM concession, as it is the interest of this thesis, two changes would be 
needed.  
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First, the private sector scenario should include the toll revenues over the life of 
the concession (instead of consisting only of an upfront lease payment). Thus, the NPV of 
the DBFOM scenario would result from contrasting the concession’s life-cycle revenues 
and costs over the contract period using the following two formulas: 
 
1. To estimate the concession’s revenues: 
 
ܴሺߝோሻ ൌ 	෍ሾݒ௜ሺߝ௩ሻ ∗ ݐ௜ሺߝ௧ሻ൫1 ൅ ݎ௜ሺߝ௥ሻ൯௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
൅ ݋ݎ௜ሺߝ௢௥ሻ
൫1 ൅ ݎ௜ሺߝ௥ሻ൯௜
ሿ 
where: 
R = present worth of total revenues in concession period, 
vi = traffic volume in year i, 
ti = average toll for unit traffic in year i, 
ori(εor) = other revenues excluding toll revenue in year i, 
n = total years of concession period, 
ri = discount rate in year i, and 
εR, εv, εt, εor, and εr = uncertainties related to toll revenue, traffic volume growth, toll rate 
growth, other revenues, and discount rate. 
 
2. To estimate the concession’s costs: 
 
ܥሺߝ஼ሻ ൌ 	෍݋௜
ሺߝ௢ሻ ∗ ݌௜൫ߝ௣൯ ൅ ݋ܿ௜ሺߝ௢௖ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሺߝ௥ሻሻ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
where: 
C = present worth of total costs in entire concession period, 
oi = operating costs in year i, 
pi = preservation costs in year i, 
oci = other costs in year i, and 
εo, εp, and εoc = uncertainties related to operating costs, preservation costs, and other 
costs. 
The second change would be in the estimation of the annual operating costs. In 
Zhang’s case study, as mentioned before, the private sector alternative comprised only 
the up-front lease payment and no estimation of costs was needed since the analysis was 
done solely from the point of view of the public entity. Conversely, in the continued in-
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house management scenario, annual operating costs were estimated by fitting a statistical 
function to the historic annual operating costs since the facility had been in operation by 
the same public entity. Because a DBFOM is a greenfield project, neither sector can 
provide historic operating costs. Therefore, the method used by Zhang is not appropriate 
for the estimation of such costs.  
The easiest way to estimate the annual operating costs would be, if possible,  to fit 
historic data from similar facilities in the geographic vicinity of the study facility that are 
under the management of the same public entity for which scenario two (a publicly 
developed and managed project) is being developed. However, as mentioned before, the 
literature on PPPs and PPP stakeholders argue strongly that the private sector is more 
efficient than the public sector. So, if true, that would mean that it is unlikely that a 
private concessionaire would incur similar operating costs as a public entity. 
Since most operating PPP projects in the U.S. have only recently started 
operations, they are at this time subject to routine O&M activities that can then be 
empirically evaluated. To assess any differences in routine O&M costs between private 
and public toll facilities, a set of indicators is proposed next and a limited-scope case 
study is presented in Chapter 4.  
 
3.2 PROPOSED COMPARISON INDICATORS 
To evaluate cost differences in tollroad management between the public and the 
private sectors, the following indicators can be used:  
3.2.1 Cost per Mile 
These indicators provide an assessment of the O&M expenditures (OPEX) per the 
length and/or operational capacity of a roadway.  
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 OPEX per center-mile: A measure of the proportion of O&M spent in relation to 
the length of the facility. 
 OPEX per lane-mile: Analyzing costs per lane-miles instead of per centerline-
miles provides a more detailed picture of the proportion of costs spent in relation 
to the operational capacity of the facilities. 
 
3.2.2 Cost per Unit Sold 
Assessing the amount of OPEX incurred against the usage of the facilities, these 
indicators depend on the volume of traffic on the facility.  
 OPEX per VMT: One way to measure facility usage is by calculating the total 
amount of vehicle miles travelled (VMT) on IT.  
 OPEX per number of toll transactions: Another road-usage metric, this 
measures the amount spent on O&M in relation to the number of times a vehicle 
passes through a toll gantry.  
 
3.2.3 Productivity 
In the U.S., labor is an expensive element in managing a roadway. The following 
metrics help to evaluate the efficiency of a facility in terms of labor usage by using full-
time equivalent employee figures.  
 Number of employees per mile: How many full-time equivalent employees are 
being used per each mile of the facility. This is what this indicator is trying to 
respond.  
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 Miles per number of employees: The opposite of the previous indicator, this 
estimates how many miles of the roadway are, in theory, under the responsibility 
of each of the employees. 
 Lane-miles per number of employees: This metric uses lane-miles to assess 
capacity (rather than simply the facility’s length).  
3.2.4 Operating Expense Ratio 
This is used to estimate the efficiency of a facility's management by comparing 
what it costs to operate it against the revenue it generates; see Table 2. 
 OPEX per toll revenue: This metric estimates the proportion of the toll revenues 
that are being used to operate and maintain the facility.  
Table 2. Proposed Comparison Indicators. 
Operating Expenditures (OPEX) 
Type Indicator Unit 
Cost/Mile 
OPEX/Mile ($/Mile) 
OPEX/Lane-Mile ($/Lane-Mile) 
Cost/Unit Sold 
OPEX/VMT (¢/VMT) 
OPEX/Transaction ($/Transaction)
Operating Expense 
Ratio OPEX/Toll Revenue (%) 
 
To illustrate the use of these indicators, an empirical analysis was conducted to 
assess the cost efficiency differences between public and private sector entities in the 
management of tolled roadways in a U.S. state. A limited-scope case study format was 
used and is presented in the following chapter. 
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3.3 FACTORS TO CONSIDER FOR AN ADEQUATE COMPARISON 
For a comparison to be effective and fair, the compared facilities should have 
relatively similar characteristics; if not, efforts should be made to try to “level the field.” 
In the case of large road infrastructure projects such as toll roads, attaining a level playing 
field is difficult since all such projects are unique. Thus, for a detailed comprehensive 
cost performance comparison to be made between different types of projects it is 
important to consider the following factors: 
 Type of highway: Whether it is a limited access highway or other type. 
 Greenfield vs. brownfield: Whether the facility is to be built on a clear site 
(greenfield project) or is a retrofit or expansion (brownfield). 
 Location: The geographic location of the facility and the character of the area 
(urban or rural) make a difference in the type and amount of traffic, and in the 
availability and cost of labor, materials and equipment required to perform O&M 
activities. 
 Traffic volume: The wear and tear of a roadway is directly related to the type and 
amount of traffic on it. Therefore, it is important to determine the forecasted 
traffic volumes, as well as its composition (proportion of light and heavy 
vehicles), because of the significant effect of weight on the pavement.  
 Pavement type: Rigid and flexible pavements have very different service lives 
and therefore differences in the amount and timing of required maintenance and 
repairs. For this reason, the type of pavement is likely one of the most important 
factors to consider when comparing the life-cycle performance and cost of 
operating a roadway. To account for those differences and to be able to compare 
their annual O&M costs, one alternative is to convert their estimated lifecycle 
costs into Equivalent Uniform Annual Costs. 
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 Frontage roads: The existence of frontage roads adjacent to the compared 
facilities not only increases the amount of required O&M activities, it can also 
increase their complexity if they have different pavement types than the mainline 
lanes. Therefore, including the frontage roads in the comparison provides a more 
detailed look into the cost performance of the facilities. 
 Area of bridges: As with frontage roads, the presence, type, and quantity of 
bridges can have important consequences for the O&M costs of a facility and it is 
therefore important to include them in the evaluation.  
 Number of toll gantries/ramps: The type, amount, and location of toll gantries 
and ramps have diverse effects in a toll road facility. For example, the O&M of 
the equipment requires specialized knowledge that can be either contracted out or 
provided in-house. Moreover, in addition to the toll collection point locations, 
whether the tolls are collected electronically in tollbooths can be an important 
determinant in the drivers’ decisions of whether to use the facility which in turn 
affects the amount of revenues collected and the wear and tear on the facility. 
 O&M decision-making approach: A concessionaire is typically a stand-alone 
private firm (or a special-purpose vehicle) that is created by the project’s private 
investors for the sole purpose of managing the concession. Because it is only 
focused on managing one project, its management is done at a project level: its 
decision-making and funding are dedicated to that one facility, which is an 
optimal arrangement for all the involved parties (the public agency, the private 
investors, and the facility users). On the other hand, when a public entity is in 
charge of managing roadways, it is typically in charge of a network of facilities 
instead of just one. Additionally, public entities usually receive their funding from 
annual budgets allocated by governmental entities to operate the entire network; 
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consequently, their decision-making is made at a network level. Because 
frequently the allocated funding is not enough to maintain the entire network at 
the highest performance levels, public entities are faced with the need to prioritize 
how to spend their allocated funds, which is a sub-optimal approach. These 
differences in what a concessionaire and a public agency can do to manage their 
facilities should be considered 
 Other: There are additional factors that should be taken into consideration such 
as who is in charge and under what conditions in an emergency, intelligent 
transportation systems (ITS), disaster evacuation, etc. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study Comparison of Operation and Maintenance 
Costs  
The purpose of this case study is to perform a limited-scope comparison of the 
differences in the routine O&M costs of a group of toll roadways in the U.S. The 
compared facilities are operated by either the public sector (a State Department of 
Transportation [DOT]) or the private sector (a private concessionaire). The objective is to 
show the use of the comparison indicators proposed in Chapter 3 to evaluate whether the 
private sector is more efficient in the management of roadways, as argued in the PPP 
literature and circles.  
Managing a tolled highway is a very complex issue; it not only includes the 
planning, oversight, and implementation of a number of technical and administrative 
activities, but it also involves the responsibility for handling large budgets and 
responding to a variety of stakeholders (government agencies, road users, investors, etc.). 
Depending on whether the roadway is managed by a public or a private entity, and on its 
location, type, size, and many other aspects, the degree of importance given to each of 
such factors may vary, but ultimately it is their combined effect that translates into the 
success or failure of the management endeavor.  
One important aspect common to these types of enterprises is the need to maintain 
certain information confidentiality, primarily for two reasons. First, most concessions and 
some publicly owned tollroads are funded by private investors; second, public access to 
financial and management strategies could expose the entity or its parent entities to 
unwarranted exposure and reduced competitive advantage in future projects. For those 
reasons, to protect the confidentiality of the data presented in this thesis, this is a “blind” 
case study, meaning that the names, locations, and the owners/managers of the facilities 
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are not disclosed. Therefore, any identifying information has been removed to the 
maximum extent possible, including references to the sources of the data used.  
 
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF COMPARED FACILITIES 
This case study focuses on a group of toll roadways in the U.S. One toll road was 
developed under a DBFOM type of PPP, as a toll concession agreement; it was therefore 
designed and built by a private concessionaire, the same entity that is in charge of its 
O&M. This facility will be referred to as “the concession,” and it will serve to illustrate 
the characteristics of a privately managed roadway.  
To contrast the private concession model to a public management model, a group 
of tollroads located in the vicinity of the concession was selected. These facilities were 
developed under more traditional procurement models: either as DBB or DB contracts 
and all of them are under the management of a State DOT. This group of toll roads was 
selected because they are close to the concession, owned by the same DOT that arranged 
the concession, and collectively managed as a system. For the remainder of this study 
they will be referred to as “the system.” 
 
4.2 STUDY PERIOD 
The study period is one year; however, the DOT records expenditures in a fiscal 
year basis while the concessionaire records expenditures on a calendar year basis. While 
consideration was given to matching information from one entity to the other entity’s 
format, since seasonal incidents such as exceptional weather conditions or similar events 
could translate into abnormal operations of a facility, it is not considered that this was the 
case during such period. Besides, as mentioned earlier the purpose of this comparison is 
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only to provide a broad illustration of the cost differences in the management of toll 
roadways. Therefore, it was decided to maintain data in their original format. As a result, 
the system data corresponds to fiscal year 2013 ending August 31, 2013, while the 
concession’s data corresponds to the 2013 calendar year, ending in December.  
 
4.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPARED FACILITIES 
The following attributes of both the concession and the system serve to give the 
reader an idea about their physical and operational characteristics. They are also key 
inputs for the comparison. 
 Type of roadway: All the roadways in this case study are toll highways 
 Length:  
o Centerline Miles: The concession has approximately 40 centerline miles 
(of the mainline lanes), while the system has approximately 73.  
o Lane-miles: Including ramps, the concession has approximately 160 lane-
miles; the system has about 345 lane-miles. 
 Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT): During calendar year 2013, the 
concession served approximately 5,564 vehicles per day. In fiscal year 2013, the 
system in the other hand served approximately 130,820 vehicles each day 
 Annual Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT): Because no actual VMT data was 
obtained, based on the AADT and the centerline miles and assuming each vehicle 
traveled the entire length of the road, estimated VMT in the concession were 
81,157,679 miles during 2013, while vehicles in the system were estimated to 
travel 735,970,669 miles in fiscal year 2013. 
 Toll Transactions: For the study period, the number of toll transactions for the 
concession was about 5,153,558, with approximately 102,507,240 for the system.  
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 Toll Revenue: For the study period, the total amount of toll revenue collected in 
the concession was an estimated $18,854,588; in the system, the total toll revenue 
was approximately $103,984,500. 
 Number of Employees: As will be discussed later in detail, it was not possible to 
determine the number of employees in charge of managing the system. As a 
result, the related comparison indicators could not be used. 
Due to the lack of readily available information about certain characteristics of the 
system not all of the proposed indicators could be used. Table 3 below summarizes the 
physical and operational characteristics of the concession and the system used in the 
comparison.  
Table 3. Characteristics of the System and the Concession.  
   System Concession 
Mainline Lanes     
Centerline miles 72.8 40.0 
Lane-miles 345.3 159.9 
Annual VMT 735,970,669 81,157,679 
AADT 130,820 5,564 
Toll Transactions 102,507,240 5,153,558 
Toll Revenue $103,984,500 $18,854,588
 
4.4 SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS 
This section summarizes the annual OPEX incurred by both the DOT and the 
concessionaire while operating and maintaining their respective facilities. 
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4.4.1 Cost Differentiation 
Differentiating between direct and indirect costs is key for an appropriate cost 
analysis. Direct costs, as defined by the White House’s Office of Management and 
Budget, are those costs that can be identified specifically with a particular cost objective, 
which in a road maintenance context includes salaries, materials, equipment, and other 
costs paid for work performed on a maintenance job (2). Conversely, indirect costs, also 
known as overhead, are those costs incurred for a purpose benefiting more than one cost 
objective and that are not readily assignable to the cost objectives specifically benefitted 
without disproportionate efforts. These include for example, oversight and supervision of 
a maintenance office to the benefit of all maintenance jobs within its jurisdiction, but 
with no direct nexus to each individual maintenance job (2).  
 
4.4.2 Availability of Cost Data 
The success of any research study depends on the type and quality of data used. In 
this case, access to detailed proprietary technical and cost information was needed about 
the facilities that comprise the system and the concession and therefore data requests 
were sent to both the DOT and the concessionaire. 
It should be recognized that despite its private nature, the concessionaire was 
open and responsive to all data requests. On the other hand, and while recognizing the 
great disposition and responsiveness of some of the DOT’s staff, the system’s detailed 
cost information requested was not provided. The reason given by the DOT’s legal 
department was that because the system is funded by private investors, they were 
concerned about the possibility of potentially confidential information being made public. 
As a result, no financial information was released other than publicly available 
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information and importantly, no clarifications about published information were 
provided. 
As a result of this non-disclosure of information, the authors could not clearly 
identify which of the system’s costs were direct or indirect and how many DOT 
employees supported the management of the system during the study period. For this 
reason, the classification of the system’s costs presented in this case study (as either 
direct or indirect) is the result of the author’s best judgment interpretation of publicly 
available financial reports. The concessionaire, on the other hand, did provide its own 
classification of direct and indirect costs. 
Lacking the input of the DOT about how its costs should be classified, the more 
unbiased way to compare the system and the concessionaire costs would be to use the 
same criteria to classify the costs of both. In this case that meant using a similar type of 
classification for the system as the one used by the concessionaire. In short, the principle 
used by the concessionaire to categorize its costs seems to have been the direct 
relationship with the O&M of the facility. For example, categories like “personnel,” 
“third-parties,” “materials,” and “utilities” were classified as direct costs when they 
involved activities like “roadway maintenance,” “tolling maintenance,” and “traffic 
management center,” but classified as indirect costs when involving other activities. 
Following the same principle, activities like “public relations and communications,” 
“financial” and “business development,” among others, were classified as indirect costs. 
However, the level of detail of the system’s published information does not allow 
accomplishing that classification easily either (see table 4 for the system’s cost 
categorization). For that reason, it was decided to create two different scenarios for the 
system’s data, based on the categorization principle used by the concessionaire, but with 
different levels of rigor. 
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Table 4. Categories of Operating Expenses of the System. 
Operating Expenses 
Professional Fees and Services 
Salaries 
Materials and Supplies 
Communication and Utilities 
Repairs and Maintenance 
Printing and Reproduction 
Contracted Services 
Advertising 
Other Operating Expenses 
 
Scenario 1 
Under this scenario, the only cost classified as direct was that of the “Repairs and 
Maintenance” category (Table 5). While that might seem “extreme,” this category is the 
only one with a name that can be easily related to the O&M of the facility, due to the lack 
of information about the subcategories or the nature of some of the categories used. 
Table 5. Assumed Cost Classification under Scenario 1. 
 Direct Cost Indirect Cost  
  
O
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ra
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g 
E
xp
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 Professional Fees and Services 
 Salaries 
 Materials and Supplies 
 Communication and Utilities 
Repairs and Maintenance 
 Printing and Reproduction 
 Contracted Services 
 Advertising 
 Other Operating Expenses 
Total $16,247,417 $31,132,386 
Percentage of Total 34.29% 65.71% 
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Scenario 2 
This scenario took a broader consideration of the reasons of why a cost category 
could be classified as direct (Table 6). In addition to the “Repairs and Maintenance” 
category included in scenario 1, the category “Contracted Services” was also classified as 
direct because the system has contracted out both its maintenance and toll collection 
operations. The other category included in this scenario was “Salaries,” because the 
management and supervision of those contracts as well as the management of the system 
are performed by DOT staff. While the authors recognize that the two latter cost 
categories could include costs from other activities that are not as directly related to the 
actual O&M, with the limited information available it is not possible to separate them.  
The category “Professional Fees and Services” was not assumed to be direct 
because it likely entails activities performed by consultants, such as those that help the 
DOT with capital planning, budgeting, and related issues. 
Table 6. Assumed Cost Classification under Scenario 2. 
 Direct Cost Indirect Cost 
  
O
pe
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E
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 Professional Fees and Services 
Salaries 
 Materials and Supplies 
 Communication and Utilities 
Repairs and Maintenance 
 Printing and Reproduction 
Contracted Services 
 Advertising 
 Other Operating Expenses 
Total $30,410,863 $16,968,940 
Percentage of Total 64.19% 35.81% 
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Overall, the system had operating expenditures of $47.3 million, of which 34.29% 
were assumed to be direct costs and 65.71% indirect costs under scenario 1. Under 
scenario 2, 64.19% were assumed to be direct costs with 35.81% assumed to be indirect. 
The concession had a total of $10.3 million in total OPEX with 56.81% being direct and 
43.19% indirect, as identified by the concessionaire (Figure 2).  
  
 
Figure 2. OPEX Cost Differentiation for the System and the Concession during the study 
period. Source: Author’s interpretation of the system’s financial statement, 
and concessionaire. 
 
4.5 COMPARISON RESULTS 
Because it is important to differentiate the type of costs when talking about 
efficiency, the comparison was done in two ways: first, for the total OPEX and then for 
the direct and indirect OPEX under each of the two scenarios. In all cases the system was 
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used as the baseline against which the concession’s costs were compared; therefore, in 
the following tables the values shown in the columns labeled “Difference” indicate the 
percentage difference that the concessionaire spent compared to what the DOT spent. In 
other words, a positive amount indicates that the concessionaire spent more than the DOT 
for that variable, while a negative value indicates the opposite. Tables 7 to 9 present the 
comparison results. 
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Table 7. Comparison of Total OPEX. Concession vs. System (Baseline). 
Indicator Unit Concession System Difference (%) 
OPEX/Mile ($/Mile) 257,929 650,821 (-60.37) 
OPEX/Lane-Mile ($/Lane-Mile) 64,482 137,213 (-53.01) 
OPEX/VMT (¢/VMT) 12.70 6.44 97.30 
OPEX/Transaction ($/Transaction) 2.00 0.46 332.75 
OPEX/Toll Revenue (%) 54.67% 45.56% 19.99 
Table 8. Comparison of Direct OPEX (D.O.) under Scenarios 1 & 2. Concession vs. 
System (Baseline). 
Indicator Unit 
Concession 
System 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
D.O. D.O. Difference (%) D.O. 
Difference 
(%) 
OPEX/Mile ($/Mile) 146,530 223,179 (-34.34) 417,732 (-64.92) 
OPEX/Lane-Mile ($/Lane-Mile) 36,632 47,053 (-22.15) 88,071 (-58.41) 
OPEX/VMT (¢/VMT) 7.22 2.21 226.85 4.13 74.63 
OPEX/Transaction ($/Trans.) 1.14 0.16 616.92 0.30 283.02 
OPEX/Toll 
Revenue (%) 31.06% 15.62% 98.78 29.25% 6.20 
 
Table 9. Comparison of Indirect OPEX (I.O.) under Scenarios 1 & 2. Concession vs. 
System (Baseline). 
Indicator Unit 
Concession
System 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
I.O. I.O. Difference (%) I.O. 
Difference 
(%) 
OPEX/Mile ($/Mile) 111,399 427,643 (-73.95) 233,090 (-52.21) 
OPEX/Lane-Mile ($/Lane-Mile) 27,850 90,160 (-69.11) 49,143 (-43.33) 
OPEX/VMT (¢/VMT) 5.49 4.23 29.68 2.31 137.92 
OPEX/Transaction ($/Trans.) 0.86 0.30 184.44 0.17 421.86 
OPEX/Toll 
Revenue (%) 23.61% 29.94% (-21.13) 16.32% 44.70 
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4.6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.6.1 Total OPEX   
As seen in Figure 3, the comparison of total operating expenses among the 
publicly and the privately managed facilities showed that the concessionaire spent a 
lower proportion of OPEX per centerline mile (-60.37%) and per lane-mile (-53.01%) 
than the DOT did. Both of these metrics are measures of cost efficiency in relation to the 
size and operational capacity of the facilities. Ergo, during this study’s analysis period the 
concessionaire was more efficient in the operation and management of its facility in 
relation to its physical size and capacity than was the DOT for its system. 
 
 
Figure 3. Graphical Comparison of Total OPEX. 
On the other hand, the concession had higher OPEX in relation to the three 
metrics that depend on the traffic volume: VMT, number of transactions, and toll 
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revenue. In this regard, the DOT was more efficient than the concessionaire during the 
study period by 97.3%, 332.75%, and 19.99%, respectively. However, the concession has 
been in operation for a shorter period of time than the system’s roads and it is still in its 
initial ramp-up period. Thus, its traffic volume was significantly lower than the system’s 
volume even when weighted by mileage (see figure 4).  
The large difference in the traffic volumes complicates the comparison of the 
traffic-dependent metrics. But, if traffic volumes increase in the concession and start 
reaching volumes closer to the forecasted numbers, the efficiency of the concession will 
likely improve and the gap with the system’s numbers could shrink. However, whether 
the concession’s efficiency indicators will match or outperform the system’s numbers is 
not known as the operation of a facility of this type is subject to several sources of 
uncertainty that could affect these metrics. 
 
 
Figure 4. Difference in the number of toll transactions per mile and per lane-mile 
between the System and the Concession. 
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4.6.2 Direct OPEX 
Scenario 1 
With the operating expenditures categorized under scenario 1, direct costs were 
compared (see Figure 5). The authors found that if the assumed cost categorization of this 
scenario was realistic, the concession was more cost-efficient than the system in regard to 
centerline miles and lane-miles by 34.3% and -22.1% respectively. Because direct costs 
are the expenditures that result in the actual O&M of the roadways (including materials, 
equipment, labor etc.), and since the facilities are located generally in the same 
geographic area (so in theory those costs should not differ greatly), these results signal a 
more efficient use of resources by the concessionaire under these assumptions. These 
differences are even more meaningful under an extreme scenario such as this one, which 
characterized only one of the cost categories as direct costs.  
When the other set of indicators were evaluated, the percentage differences were 
largely favorable to the system, as the concessionaire was assumed to have spent 226.8%, 
616.9%, and 98.7% more per VMT, per number of transactions, and per toll revenue, 
respectively, than the DOT. This indicates that based on the traffic-dependent indicators 
under scenario 1, the DOT would have been extremely more cost-efficient in terms of 
direct costs than the concessionaire. Yet, while these results point toward the same trend 
found with the total OPEX, the large increase in the magnitude of the differences is due 
to the fact that scenario 1 was extreme in the sense that only one cost category was 
considered direct cost, meaning a small amount. 
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Figure 5. Graphical Comparison of Direct OPEX under scenario 1. 
 
Scenario 2 
Under scenario 2, the concessionaire was assumed again not only to be more cost 
efficient than the DOT in regard to miles (-64.9%) and lane-miles (-58.4%), but by a 
differential at least twice as big. Evidently this is the result of a larger amount of money 
classified as direct under this scenario, which included two more cost categories in 
addition to scenario 1.  
In terms of VMT, number of transactions, and toll revenue, the system was 
assumed under this scenario to be more cost efficient than the concession, although by 
much smaller margins: 74.6%, 283%, and 6.2%, respectively. As mentioned before, this 
is the result of having a larger proportion of the costs classified as direct. Something to 
note is that, despite the overwhelmingly larger traffic volumes in the system, the 
difference in the direct operating expense ratio (direct OPEX/toll revenues) would have 
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been only 6.2% higher than that of the system if the assumed cost classification was 
appropriate.  
 
 
Figure 6. Graphical Comparison of Direct OPEX under scenario 2. 
 
4.6.3 Indirect OPEX 
Scenario 1 
Regarding the indirect costs, under scenario 1 the concessionaire spent 
approximately 73.9% less in overhead per centerline-mile and 69.1% less per lane-mile 
than the DOT. Regarding VMT and number of transactions, the overall trend remained, 
showing that the system would have been more cost-efficient than the concession, 
although by much smaller margins: 29.6% and 184.4% respectively. With scenario 1 
classifying most of the costs as indirect, the increase in the magnitudes of the differentials 
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in favor of the concession when compared to the total OPEX per mile and per lane-mile 
are indicators is no surprise.  
In contrast, the indirect operating expense ratio (indirect cost per toll revenue) 
under scenario 1 showed that the concession was 21.1% more cost efficient than the 
system; in other words, the concessionaire is assumed to have spent 21.1% less in 
overhead costs in relation to the toll revenue it collected than the system did. While it is 
recognized that scenario 1 characterized most of the system’s costs as indirect, this result 
is still interesting since it reversed the overall trends that showed the system as more cost-
efficient in terms of the three traffic-related indicators under all other scenarios and cost 
analyses. 
 
 
Figure 7. Graphical Comparison of Indirect OPEX under scenario 1. 
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Scenario 2 
The decrease in the proportion of indirect cost in this scenario compared to 
scenario 1 evidently translates into a reduction of the magnitude of the differentials 
between the indirect costs indicators. However, the concessionaire continued to appear 
more cost-efficient in terms of miles (-52.2%) and lane-miles (-43.3%), as in all the 
scenarios and analyses.  
All three traffic-dependent indicators showed a better cost-efficiency by the DOT 
under scenario 2 assumptions. Specifically, the system would have spent 137.9% less in 
regard to VMT, 421.8% in terms of number of transactions, and 44.7% less in indirect 
costs per toll revenue.  
 
 
Figure 8.Graphical Comparison of Indirect OPEX under scenario 2. 
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4.6.4 Summary 
The comparison found that the concessionaire was more cost-efficient in terms of 
total OPEX and in terms of the assumed direct and indirect OPEX per mile, and per lane-
mile than the DOT. The DOT was shown to be more cost efficient than the 
concessionaire for all types of OPEX (total and assumed direct and indirect) in relation to 
the number of VMT and the number of toll transactions. However, those two metrics 
depend on the amount of traffic volume on the facilities—during the study period, traffic 
volume was overwhelmingly greater on the system, helping it to spread its costs over a 
much larger base. If and when the concession reaches higher traffic volumes (as it ends 
its ramp-up period), the gap with the system’s numbers could decrease.  
Special attention should be given to the operating expense ratio (OPEX per toll 
revenue), a useful and simple tool to estimate cost-efficiency in the O&M of different 
facilities, because of its distinct behavior in this study. This ratio indicated that the DOT-
managed system was more efficient in terms of total OPEX. However, once again it 
should be noted that, like the two previous indicators, this one depends on traffic volume, 
a factor that favors the system’s cost efficiency. When direct costs were analyzed under 
the conservative scenario 2, the concessionaire was assumed to have spent only about 6% 
more than the DOT.  
This finding is important because direct costs are those directly related to the 
actual O&M work, but the system has contracted out its maintenance to a private 
contractor, while the concessionaire uses its own employees to perform the O&M 
activities. Therefore, this could be an indication that that the concessionaire is in fact 
more efficient in the performance of the O&M activities than the DOT maintenance 
contractor.  
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While there is no definite data to support it, one hypothesis could be that as 
suggested by the literature, the DBFOM concessionaire made certain decisions during the 
design and/or construction phases with the goal of minimizing the life-cycle operation of 
its facility. Another reason could be that, since the contractor was not involved in the 
design and/or construction of the system’s roads, its fees include a cost element that 
accounts for the risks it takes for maintaining a set of facilities for which it cannot vouch. 
Figure 9 presents all the comparison scenarios in a graphical manner.  
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Figure 9. Graphical Comparison of all OPEX and scenarios.  
OPEX / Mile OPEX /Lane-Mile
OPEX /
VMT
OPEX
/Transaction
OPEX / Toll
Revenue
Total OPEX -60.37% -53.01% 97.30% 332.75% 19.99%
Direct OPEX (1) -34.34% -22.15% 226.85% 616.92% 98.78%
Direct OPEX (2) -64.92% -58.41% 74.63% 283.02% 6.20%
Indirect OPEX (1) -73.95% -69.11% 29.68% 184.44% -21.13%
Indirect OPEX (2) -52.21% -43.33% 137.92% 421.86% 44.70%
-100%
0%
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
The literature on PPPs argues extensively that the private sector is more efficient 
than the public sector in operating road infrastructure, and identifies this efficiency as one 
of the main benefits of PPPs. Yet, those studies don’t provide empirical support for such 
a claim. Therefore, this thesis conducted a four-prong investigation: first, it searched the 
literature for evidence of those efficiencies as well as methods to evaluate them. Second, 
it proposed a simple way to compare life-cycle cost efficiency in toll roads. The results 
showed the following: 
1. The conducted literature review found no empirical evidence for superior 
cost-efficiency of PPP concessionaires in the O&M phase. 
2. The majority of studies comparing PPPs against publicly developed 
projects were focused on design and construction costs and schedule 
overruns, some of which used not-so-rigorous evaluations as pointed out 
by other researchers. 
3. Some studies that assessed performance and/or efficiency during a 
project’s life-cycle were at times highly theoretical and the methods they 
use are not likely being employed outside of academia. 
4. The NPV-based probabilistic framework proposed by Zhang et al. to 
evaluate the life cycle economic efficiency of leased toll roads could also 
be used, in a scenario analysis, to evaluate the life-cycle efficiency of 
DBFOM projects against traditionally developed projects. The framework 
is useful due to its simplicity, life-cycle approach, and the ability to 
evaluate uncertainty. Yet, in Zhang’s study, the annual operating cost, one 
of the framework’s inputs, was not evaluated as part of the private 
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management scenario; for the public scenario it used historical data since 
the toll road was already in operation. Therefore, a methodology to 
estimate the annual operating costs for both the public and private 
scenarios is not available for the evaluation of greenfield projects. 
Third, to empirically test the assumption about the private sector’s greater 
efficiency in roadway operation, a set of simple comparison indicators were proposed. 
Fourth, to illustrate the use of these indicators, a limited-scope case study was performed 
to compare the routine O&M expenditures of a concession against those of a system of 
publicly managed toll roads yielding these results:  
5. There were significant differences between the privately and the publicly 
managed facilities in terms of the cost efficiency of the routine O&M 
activities. Specifically: 
 The concession was more cost-efficient in terms of OPEX per mile 
and per lane-mile than was the system. The system was more cost-
efficient than the concession in relation to the number of VMT and 
the number of toll transactions. Yet, those indicators depend on the 
traffic volume on the facilities which during the study period was 
overwhelmingly greater on the system, helping it to spread costs 
over a much larger base. If and when the concession reaches higher 
traffic volumes as it ends its ramp-up period, the gap between the 
concession’s and the system’s numbers is likely to decrease. 
6. The operating expense ratio (OPEX/toll revenue) indicated that overall, 
the DOT-managed system was more efficient than the privately managed 
concession. However, toll revenue is also a factor of traffic volume. 
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7. The difference in managing a network of facilities (as public agencies 
typically do) versus managing a single facility (as concessionaires do), 
was evident in terms of coordination between different sections within the 
entities. Some DOT staff lacked a basic understanding of the system’s 
management, financial, and performance characteristics; this was not an 
issue with the concessionaire’s staff. 
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Chapter 6: Limitations and Future Work 
The main limitation of this assessment was the non-disclosure of the public toll 
road system’s detailed financial data. Citing confidentiality concerns, the DOT’s legal 
department forbade any release or clarification of financial information. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, this created the need for the authors to assume what costs were to be classified 
as direct or indirect and eliminated the possibility of assessing efficiency in terms of 
number of employees. On the other hand, the private concessionaire, despite being 
privately funded and managed, had no reservations about sharing their financial and 
physical information.  
Another limitation of the case study was the inability to use more comparison 
indicators—such as OPEX per area of bridges, OPEX per miles of frontage roads, and 
other similar metrics—due to the lack of readily available information about some of the 
DOT system’s physical characteristics. This issue further limited the comprehensiveness 
of the case study’s evaluation 
 
FUTURE EFFORTS 
While the case study showed differences in cost-efficiency in routine toll road 
O&M activities between the public and private sectors, additional research should be 
done to empirically test the hypothesis of the private sector’s greater efficiency in 
delivering and managing road infrastructure. While it would be interesting if other 
methodologies were proposed, Zhang et al.’s proposed framework can be used in future 
efforts, as it is simple and easily understood by decision-makers and stakeholders, an 
important consideration that is sometimes forgotten by academics. However, adequate 
data and assumptions about O&M costs are needed to be able to produce adequate 
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results. For that, more comprehensive case studies than this one should be performed, 
using either the proposed or similar indicators to obtain sufficiently detailed empirical 
data. Additionally, the factors identified as necessary to adequately make comparisons 
should be evaluated. 
The results of those assessments will help public sector decision-makers to decide 
whether to procure a project as a PPP, and aid concessionaires wanting to evaluate 
themselves against public agencies, or when entering new markets. Ultimately more 
comprehensive studies can help to either prove or disprove the still unsupported claims 
found in the literature today. 
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